All papers are work in progress. Please do not cite them without prior consent
The Politics of Partial Liberalization: Cronyism and Non-Tariff Protection in Mubarak's Egypt
(with A. Malik, current draft: November 2018)
This paper provides one of the first systematic empirical assessments of the impact of political connections on trade protection. Based on a unique compilation of sector-level data on non-tariff measures (NTMs) and politically connected businessmen in Mubarak-era Egypt, we explore the within-sector variation in NTMs over time, and show that sectors populated by politically connected businessmen witnessed systematically higher incidence and intensity of non-tariff protection. Our results suggest that the presence of cronies in the preceding period is a strong predictor of the subsequent introduction of NTMs. Crony presence also shapes the prevalence (or density) of NTMs, as measured by the share of products subject to NTMs, and the intensity of protection, as measured by the number of NTMs introduced, and the types of NTM barriers imposed. Our results are derived from robust empirical methods that simultaneously allow us to address temporal dependence, fixed effects and endogeneity concerns. To establish causality, we take advantage of the nearly universal introduction of new NTMs across sectors in the wake of the EU-Egypt trade agreement in 2004-05 to show that sectors with crony activity benefited significantly more from this upward shift in NTM protection.
Unpacking the Islamist vote: God, nation, or the economy?
(with D. Engelcke, current draft: June 2016)
Post-2011 elections in the Arab World have seen voters flow to and ebb away from Islamists parties, to the extent that the profile of Islamist core voters seems blurred. Existing literature does not sufficiently answer the question of who votes for Islamists either, as it is dominated by single case studies, plagued by a confusion of Islamists movements and parties, activists and voters, and preoccupied with the question of whether Islamists can be democrats. Developing an innovative typology of Islamist voters, this article is the first to map out the spectrum of Islamist core supporters in a larger cross-national study of countries. Based on data from ten Arab countries surveyed in the third wave of the Arab Barometer (2012-2014), our findings challenge the myth that Islamist voters are driven by socioeconomic concerns. Instead, our study emphasizes the importance of religious ideology, conservatism, and nationalism to explain identification with Islamist parties.
Dictators under Stress: The Dilemma of Authoritarian Responses to Mass Crises
(with T. Richter and V. Lucas, current draft: June 2014)
Dictators can be overthrown by either mass uprisings or elite-based coups. Whilst both events have often been treated separately in the existing literature, this paper argues that they are linked. Using a two-stage deterrence game, we demonstrate that mass crises may serve as a starting point to end a dictator’s rule. The dictator fears the split-off by a challenger who might openly side with the protesters and together with them challenges her rule. The adequate response to this risk is deterrence. Yet, in the face of deterrence, the ruling elite fears a power grab as the dictator might benefit from the situation to extend her power share. This risk increases the likelihood of a coup launched in response by the ruling elite. Highlighting power differentials and information asymmetry between the dictator and the ruling elite, our model reveals that dictators with strong infrastructural power to enforce their decisions are capable of deterring without facing a coup; dictators who include their ruling elite in the decision-making processes do not have to fear a coup after using deterrence. Only dictators combining low enforcement capacities with the exclusion of elite members from decision-making face a dilemma: they deter in order to avoid a challenger entry, but subsequently get removed by an elite-based coup d’état. Employing logit estimations, our empirical results provide evidence for our theoretical predictions.
Do Different Autocracies Perform Differently? An Empirical Investigation of Social Welfare Expenditures
(with T. Richter and V. Lucas, current draft: September 2012)
While the study of the welfare state is a well-established field in comparative politics of democratic countries, the determinants of welfare spending in autocracies remain largely unexplored. Most likely, it is the lack of appropriate data on social spending which has hindered research on the authoritarian welfare state and social spending in particular. In this paper, we introduce the Global State Revenues and Expenditures (GSRE) data set, which, among 44 different indicators, also includes new data on social welfare spending for almost all autocracies between 1946 and 2010. Relying on these new data, we estimate the effect of economic growth on welfare spending with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model. We show that, in general, economic growth has a positive effect on welfare spending. This effect tends to vary, however, across different regime types. The main reason for this divergence is to be found, as we argue, in the varying coalitional bases that underpin different types of authoritarian regimes.
The Politics of Partial Liberalization: Cronyism and Non-Tariff Protection in Mubarak's Egypt
(with A. Malik, current draft: November 2018)
This paper provides one of the first systematic empirical assessments of the impact of political connections on trade protection. Based on a unique compilation of sector-level data on non-tariff measures (NTMs) and politically connected businessmen in Mubarak-era Egypt, we explore the within-sector variation in NTMs over time, and show that sectors populated by politically connected businessmen witnessed systematically higher incidence and intensity of non-tariff protection. Our results suggest that the presence of cronies in the preceding period is a strong predictor of the subsequent introduction of NTMs. Crony presence also shapes the prevalence (or density) of NTMs, as measured by the share of products subject to NTMs, and the intensity of protection, as measured by the number of NTMs introduced, and the types of NTM barriers imposed. Our results are derived from robust empirical methods that simultaneously allow us to address temporal dependence, fixed effects and endogeneity concerns. To establish causality, we take advantage of the nearly universal introduction of new NTMs across sectors in the wake of the EU-Egypt trade agreement in 2004-05 to show that sectors with crony activity benefited significantly more from this upward shift in NTM protection.
Unpacking the Islamist vote: God, nation, or the economy?
(with D. Engelcke, current draft: June 2016)
Post-2011 elections in the Arab World have seen voters flow to and ebb away from Islamists parties, to the extent that the profile of Islamist core voters seems blurred. Existing literature does not sufficiently answer the question of who votes for Islamists either, as it is dominated by single case studies, plagued by a confusion of Islamists movements and parties, activists and voters, and preoccupied with the question of whether Islamists can be democrats. Developing an innovative typology of Islamist voters, this article is the first to map out the spectrum of Islamist core supporters in a larger cross-national study of countries. Based on data from ten Arab countries surveyed in the third wave of the Arab Barometer (2012-2014), our findings challenge the myth that Islamist voters are driven by socioeconomic concerns. Instead, our study emphasizes the importance of religious ideology, conservatism, and nationalism to explain identification with Islamist parties.
Dictators under Stress: The Dilemma of Authoritarian Responses to Mass Crises
(with T. Richter and V. Lucas, current draft: June 2014)
Dictators can be overthrown by either mass uprisings or elite-based coups. Whilst both events have often been treated separately in the existing literature, this paper argues that they are linked. Using a two-stage deterrence game, we demonstrate that mass crises may serve as a starting point to end a dictator’s rule. The dictator fears the split-off by a challenger who might openly side with the protesters and together with them challenges her rule. The adequate response to this risk is deterrence. Yet, in the face of deterrence, the ruling elite fears a power grab as the dictator might benefit from the situation to extend her power share. This risk increases the likelihood of a coup launched in response by the ruling elite. Highlighting power differentials and information asymmetry between the dictator and the ruling elite, our model reveals that dictators with strong infrastructural power to enforce their decisions are capable of deterring without facing a coup; dictators who include their ruling elite in the decision-making processes do not have to fear a coup after using deterrence. Only dictators combining low enforcement capacities with the exclusion of elite members from decision-making face a dilemma: they deter in order to avoid a challenger entry, but subsequently get removed by an elite-based coup d’état. Employing logit estimations, our empirical results provide evidence for our theoretical predictions.
Do Different Autocracies Perform Differently? An Empirical Investigation of Social Welfare Expenditures
(with T. Richter and V. Lucas, current draft: September 2012)
While the study of the welfare state is a well-established field in comparative politics of democratic countries, the determinants of welfare spending in autocracies remain largely unexplored. Most likely, it is the lack of appropriate data on social spending which has hindered research on the authoritarian welfare state and social spending in particular. In this paper, we introduce the Global State Revenues and Expenditures (GSRE) data set, which, among 44 different indicators, also includes new data on social welfare spending for almost all autocracies between 1946 and 2010. Relying on these new data, we estimate the effect of economic growth on welfare spending with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model. We show that, in general, economic growth has a positive effect on welfare spending. This effect tends to vary, however, across different regime types. The main reason for this divergence is to be found, as we argue, in the varying coalitional bases that underpin different types of authoritarian regimes.
